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ilAMI LAW QUARTERLY
for members of their race constitutes a labor dispute.' 5 Prior cases have held
that a closed shop contract could not be made by a union which arbitrarily
excluded Negroes solely because of their color,' or other qualified persons 17
from membership. This court has extended the decisions of these former cases
by holding that the Negro race constitutes a closed union. The words of the
court are not necessarily confined to this one race, but would appear to apply
to all races, Because race and color are inherent qualities, those persons who
are born with such qualities constitute among themselves a closed union which
others cannot join. Thus, if the store had yielded to the demands of the
petitioners in this case, its hiring policy would have constituted, as to a propor-
tion of its employees, the equivalent of both a closed shop and a closed union
in favor of the Negro race. As to this proportion of jobs, a qualified worker
of any other race though a union member, could not have been hired. Therefore,
the picketing was properly enjoined.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - VALIDATION OF BOND ISSUE
The City of Fort Lauderdale, Florida petitioned to obtain a decree validat-
ing an issue of recreational revenue bonds, the proceeds to be used for the
purpose of acquiring lands and constructing a municipal recreation center
thereon. The principal and interest were to be payable solely from the revenue
of the recreational facilities, and froin the proceeds of a utilities service tax.
A freeholder's election, apparently required by the Florida Constitution,' had
not been conducted. From a judgment for the City, the intervenor appealed.
Held: Judgment affirmed. No election by the freeholders was required because
the pledging of utility taxes is permitted by statute.2 These bonds do not consti-
15. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938) (the desire
for fair and equitable conditions on the part of persons of any race or color and the
removal of discrimination against them by reason of their race and religion is quite as
important to those concerned as conditions of employment can be to any labor organiza-
tion).
16. Williams v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 27 Cal.2d 586, 165 P.2d
903 (1946) (employer may be enjoined from indirectly assisting in carrying out dis-
criminatory practices against Negroes through a closed shop contract) ; Thompson v.
Moore Drydock Co., 27 Cal.2d 595, 165 P.2d 901 (1946); cf. Steele v. Louisville and
Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
17. Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal.2d 746, 155 P.2d 343 (1944) (if the worker meets the
conditions imposed, the union must accept him for membership or give up its demands for
a closed shop).
1. F.A. CONST. Art. IX, § 6 ("... and the Counties, Districts or Municipalities
of the State of Florida shall haie power to issue bonds only after the same shall have
been approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election in which a majority of
the freeholders who are qualified electors residing in such Counties, Districts, or
Municipalities shall participate, to be held in the manner to be prescribed by law . . .).
2. Fla. Laws Spec. Acts of 1947, c. 24514, § 1 (4) [". . . and to pledge the revenue
derived from any such facility (recreational) or any other available funds to pay and
discharge any bonds which might have been issued in connection with securing moneys
to construct or improve such facilities"] (italics ours).
CASES NOTED
tute an obligation of the City, and no bondholder can ever coerce the City to
enforce a tax on real estate to service principal or interest. Schneller v. City of
Fort Lauderdale, 38 So.2d 36 (Fla' 1948) (three Justices dissenting).
It is the well established rule 3 in Florida, notwithstanding the require-
ments of the Florida Constitution, that honds, secured solely by a pledge of
the revenues from a city facility, may be issued without the approvilg vote
of the freeholders. However, the principal case and the case of State T,, City of
Winter Park,4 which was cited by the court as precedent, are the only cases
in Florida holding that a municipality can pledge its utility taxes to secure an
indebtedness without the approving vote of the freeholders.
In the Winter Park case, the court, in a sumniary discussion of this issue,
relied on four prior cases. Three of these cases 5 involved the issuance of bonds
secured by tolls and other revenue received from toll roads and bridges. The
bonds stated that the toll roads and bridges were to he leased or sold to tihe
State Road Departmnent which was to pay as rent, or as the purchase price,
eighty p;r cent of the surpllus gasoline taxes collected by the State of Florida
and by it allocated to the counties. These gasoline taxes were pledged together
with the tolls from the roads and bridges as security for the bonds. The
fourth case 6 involved the issuance of bonds, by the County Board of Instruc-
tion, secured bv funds received by the county from the pari-mutuel race track
tax collected by the state. It is to be noted that in these four cases, as well
as in the principal case and the Winter Park case, excise taxes were pledged
to secure bonds without an approving vote of the freeholders.
Nevertheless, the "gas tax" and "race track tax" cases appear distin-
guishable because constitutional amendments, 7 and statutes enacted pLirsuant
thereto., gave state agencies and counties the power to pledge these specified
excise taxes to the service of bonds issued by these agencies and counties
3. E.g., State v. City of Winter Park, 34 So.2d 740 (Fla. 1948) ; Zinnell N. City 4-f
Fort Lauderdale, 159 Fla. 498, 32 So.2d 162 (1948) ; State v. City of Miami, 157 Fla.
726, 27 So.2d 118 (1946); State v. City of Tampa, 148 Fla. 6, 3 So.2d 484 (1941) ; cf.
Kathleen Citrus Land Co. v. City of Lakeland, 124 Fla. 659, 169 So. 356 (1936);
Hygerna v. City of Sebring, 124 Fla. 683, 169 So. 366 (1936). Contra: Charles v.
City of Miami, 125 Fla. 110, 169 So. 589 (1936) (this case was distinguished in the
principal case on the ground that it involved a pledge of city assets to service bonds.
However, this distinction is not quite clear inasmuch as the bonds were to be payable
solely from the revenue ana income of the facility and were not to constitute a lien on any
property of the city).
4. 34 So.2d 740 (Fla. 1948).
5. State v. Florida State Improvement Commission, 159 Fla. 350, 31 So.2d 554
(1947) [a per curiam opinion based on State v, Florida State Improvement Commission,
159 Fla. 338, 31 So.2d 548 (1947)] ; State v. State Board of Administration. 157 Fla.
360. 25 So.2d 880 (1946) ; State v. Escambia County, 153 Fla. 282, 14 So.2d 576 (1943).
6. Prescott v. Board of Public Instruction of Hardee County, 159 Fla. 663, 32 So.2d
731 (1947).
7. FLiA. CONST. Art. IX, § 16 (Which has been interpreted to have vested an unlimited
discretion to use gas taxes for the best interests of the county. See State v. State Board
of Administration, supra) ; FLA. CONS?. Art. IX, § 15.
8. FLA. STAT. §§ 341.63, 420,06 (1941); Fla. Laws Spec. Acts of 1947. cc: 24224,
23758; Fla. Laws Spec, Acts of 1941, c, 21216, § 14, c. 20555.
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without the approving vote of the freeholders. In the Winter Park case, the
only applicable provision 9 of the constitution required the approval of the
freeholders before bonds could be issued.*
The court, in the principal case, in allowing the city to pledge utility taxes
without the approval of the freeholders, based its decision on the words "any
other available funds" in the statute 11 and on the Winter Park case. This view
seems subject to the objection, not raised in the case. that it implies that the
legislature has the power to render the constitution impotent by statutory
enactments which allow a city to do indirectly that which it cannot do directly.
It may be that the court allows the pledging of excise taxes because the
use of the word "freeholders" indicates that the intent of the fralers of tw
constitution was to prevent the unfettered imposition of ad valoren) tl,<es on
real property. 12 Under this construction, the pledging of excise taxes wonld
not be within the constitutional prohibition.
This construction of the constitution seems to depart from the former
view that the taxing power could not be pledged without an approving vote
of the freeholders." The rule now appears to be that a municipality can pledge
a portion of its taxing power without the freeholders' approval. 1 4
The drafters of any proposed Florida Constitution should consider the
effect of the principal case and expressly provide that no excise or ad valorem
tax, except as provided for in Article IX, §§ 15, 16, can be pledged without
the approval of the voters.15
9. See note 1 supra.
10. See note 1 supra.
11. See note 2 supra.
12. See State v. Pinellas County, 36 So.2d 216, 219 (Fla. 1948) ("nothing .. .
could be construed as requiring that said bonds be serviced by the imposition of ad
valorem .. .taxes"); id. at 220 (concurring opinion) : "Section 6, Art. IX of the Consti-
tution has reference only to bonds which are to be serviced by ad valorem taxation
(i.e., a direct tax upon real property) .... This word [freeholders] connotes landowners.
... The obvious purpose of the framers . . .was to make sure that bonds, which would
be serviced by levying and assessing taxes against real property, should not be issued
unless the freeholders . . . should approve the issuance; Schmeller v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, supra, at 38 ("... and no holder of them [bonds] can ever coerce the
taxing power of the City or enforce a tax on any real estate..(..") ; id. at 39 (dissenting
opinion) ("The Constitution speaks of bonds. It is not limited to that class of bonds
secured by ad valorem taxation .. ").
13. See cases cited note 3 supra; cf. Posey v. Wakulla County, 148 Fla. 115, 3 So.2d
799 (1941): Tapers v. Pichard, 124 Fla. 549, 169 So. 39 (1936) (bonds, serviced by an
ad valorem tax on real property can be issued without approval of the freeholders, if
the proceeds of the bonds are to be used to acquire assets which are an essential govern-
mental requirement, e.g., a jail and a courthouse).
14. It is not yet clear what the limits of this portion may be.
IS. REFFrARN. A PROPOSED COxsTITUrTION FOR FLORIDA, Art. IX, § 4 (Stetson Univ.
Press 1947) (expressly continues the use of the word "freeholders").
